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Introduction 
 
In some independent states and in territories on the road to decolonisation, the colonial 
past is not an abstract memory but rather “unfinished business”, given the stark socio-economic 
inequalities that persist between indigenous and settler populations (Johnson, 2018, p. 2; 
Mbembe, 2018). If we look at the latest census (2014) of New Caledonia, we notice 23,000 
inhabitants more than the previous one (2009), among which 8,000 immigrants. Only 75% of 
local population growth is domestic; of the rest, 16% were born in France or in another French 
department, 2.7% in Wallis and Futuna, 1.5% in Polynesia and 4.8% in another country. This 
increase in population is much higher than that of France (+0.5%), French Polynesia (+0.6%) 
or Wallis and Futuna (-1.9%) (Broustet & Rivoilan, 2015). Not without reason, immigration is 
still at the core of the debate around the list of voters in New Caledonia. Decades of 
immigration from France and other French overseas territories have rendered the indigenous 
Kanak population a demographical minority in its own land. This means that the Kanak 
independence movement is unable to obtain dominate local politics and win an independence 
referendum with an outright majority. 
The Accords of Matignon-Oudinot (1988) and of Nouméa (1998) did set up the 
foundations for an irreversible decolonisation process; and New Caledonia is included in the 
UN list of jurisdictions yet to be decolonised. However, decolonisation is not a simple issue of 
institutional status change – from an overseas territory to a sovereign state – as defined in 
international law. It is a deeper transformation. The French State still holds five sovereign 
powers (defence, most aspects of foreign relations, finance and currency, justice and public 
order) over New Caledonia. It participates in the decolonisation process through some specific 
funding measures: these are ways of redeeming itself from its colonial legacy, while assuring 
its presence and influence in the Pacific. France directly financed some military and civic 
investment like for example bought of ships and aircrafts or maintenance of cultural heritage 
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(in 2016 total expenditure was nearly US52m; public expenditure was around US$356,000 and 
funding for public entities, such as “Institution of Research for Development” and the “French 
Agency for the Biodiversity”, around US$37m). This to give an idea of the fiscal transfers from 
France to New Caledonia (IEOM, 2017). These transfers are repeatedly criticised by separatist 
parties because they do not encourage self-reliance or an internal economic dynamic, most of 
are eventually returned to the state coffers (via taxes, etc.) and thwart the Kanak people from 
exercising control over fiscal prudence, public administration and funding, which lie at the 
basis of political power on the island territory. In addition, the French state is the major 
shareholder of ERAMET, the parent-company of Société Le Nickel, SLN, which holds a 53% 
share in New Caledonia’s nickel deposits at the Doniambo site (SLN, 2019). For this reason, 
France is often accused by separatists of having lingering colonial and imperialist interests in 
the territory.  
From the other side, the Kanaks have been engaged since the 1980s, in a process of 
decolonisation that seeks to break with the centre-periphery models of France/New-Caledonia 
and South Province/North Province, and have come to focus instead on the 
“interdependencies” (Tjibaou, 1996, p. 179). The Société Minière du Sud Pacifique (SMSP), a 
local mining company whose major shareholder is the Northern Province under the control of 
Kanak separatist parties, now owns 51% of the single on-shore nickel project in New Caledonia 
called “Koniambo” and two more offshore in South Korea and China. Looking beyond a post-
colonial approach concerning the ways in which rich countries exploit poor ones, this paper 
explores how a significant proportion of Indigenous people has the desire to be present and 
acknowledged within the global system. Nickel conveys the desire of Being-there-in-the-
world, the Dasein of Martin Heidegger. How else to escape from the colonial system in which 
Kanak found themselves immersed? Being-there, existing, means to relate with other things 
present in the world in order to realise one’s own project. Market forces and mining become 
instruments and ways of openness, voice and visibility, and no longer of suppression 
(Horowitz, 2004). 
Based on ten months of fieldwork in the northern region of New Caledonia and inspired 
by the historic event marked by the referendum, the aim of this paper – which is more 
ethnographic than theoretical – is to analyse the role of mining in the political arrangements 
being considered for New Caledonia’s future. In particular, this paper examines: 1) the stakes 
of an independence referendum; 2) the relations between islandness and the management of 
natural resources; and 3) the desire of Indigenous people to be present and acknowledged 
within the global system. The current political conjuncture of stalemate (the next two 
referendums are scheduled for 2020 and 2022 respectively), the geographical position of this 
archipelago and the geo-strategic aspirations of the French State, together with the separatists’ 
determination to secure independence, cast a light on future mining policies and practices in 
that territory.  
 
“France would not be the same without New Caledonia” 
 
Before going into the subject of this article, let me briefly evoke an important moment in 
the history of the process of decolonisation of New Caledonia, in order to understand the way 
in which France looks at and relates to New Caledonia.  
Built on an imperialistic project of settlement, New Caledonia was an unprecedented 
experience in French history. It was the product of a social experiment that wanted to build a 
new society, blending condemned and ‘honest’ migrants (Merle, 1993). New Caledonia, 
conceived as a privileged container for the most dangerous criminal classes of France, was 
subjected to its own brand of settlement politics. This was immediately successful. At the end 
of penal colony (1897), immigrants comprised more than 20% of the entire local population 
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and Grand Terre (the large island of New Caledonia) already had the aspect of a “little Austral 
France”, an overseas symbol of national power. The discovery of nickel (1863) by French 
engineer Jules Garnier consolidated the French presence in the Pacific Ocean. Nickel was and 
remains a strategic mineral for France (Ward, 2017). 
“France would not be the same without New Caledonia.” If the subtle purpose of French 
President Emmanuel Macron visiting New Caledonia just a few months before the referendum 
for independence was to push the local citizenry to remain French, my interlocutors perceived 
this sentence in a colonial way: “France is beautiful, thanks to our mineral richness”, as they 
usually said to me angrily but with some pride as well. In relation to other Pacific islands, New 
Caledonia was left untouched much longer by European explorers. It was in 1774 that British 
captain James Cook landed on Balade, on the north-east cost of Grande Terre. Its inhabitants 
– not yet called ‘Kanak’ – lived in groups, mainly in the valleys and near the sea. Only in 1853 
did France officially take possession of the territory, guided by Admiral Febvrier-Despointes. 
On April 2018, I was on site doing fieldwork when French President announced his 
forthcoming overseas visit and the restitution of the original colonisation deeds, previously 
conserved in the archives of Aix-en-Provence, in continental France. The first was signed in 
Balade on 24 September 1853; and the other five days later on the Isle of Pines. Reactions 
within the population were mixed: for some, it was a symbol of confirmed reconciliation; for 
others, simply a publicity stunt; and for some separatist leaders, a “missed opportunity” – as 
Daniel Goa, spokesperson of the separatist party “Union Calédonienne”, confessed to me. No 
act of forgiveness in a “traditional way” took place; nor was there a public recognition of 
colonisation as a “crime against humanity”, as Macron stated when visiting the former French 
colony of Algeria in 2017 (RFI, 2017).  
For the second time, the international media spotlight has been turned onto the island of 
Ouvéa. In the 1980s, tensions between the indigenous Kanak communities and the Europeans 
erupted into violence and culminated on 5 May 1988 with the assault of the cave of Ouvéa: 
nineteen separatists were killed by French army. Exactly thirty years later, and for the first time 
since that bloody event remembered as the “Drama of Ouvéa”, this island has hosted a French 
president during its commemoration day. At the same time, the “Comité Gossanah” – a group 
of people constituted mainly by the relatives of dead Kanaks which did not want the presence 
of Macron - was prevented by the police from participating in the commemoration for the first 
time, as a security measure (Peteisi and Goapana, 2018). Nevertheless, local media defined 
Macron as a “ferryman”, an interlocutor whose role was to recognise the past and transform it 
into a bridge for the future. In one of Macron’s speech overseas, he deploys a linear and 
cumulative sense of history,  
 
New Caledonia is an addition of stories, often tragic, others happy, all of them characterised 
by bravery and the desire to be successful. There are Kanaks, Caldoches, Z’oreilles, 
Wallisians, Futunians, Polynesians, Javanese, Japanese, and others who have built what is 
New Caledonia today. What we have done this morning in Iaai (Ouvéa) is to also reconcile 
our stories. … We are in this alliance of memories and this is an irreversible movement 
(Elysée, 2018). 
 
The act of reconciliation was symbolised that day by Macron planting a coconut tree, 
which represents fertility in the Kanak culture. Assuming that the past could be disconnected 
from the present is a well-rooted idea in the western notion of history. “Past” defines “modern”, 
by opposition (Hirsch & Stewart, 2005, p. 265). On the contrary, in the Kanak culture, past is 
physically inscribed on landscape, in genealogy, on bodies, and it is constantly performed in 
quotidian discourse. The “customary paths” (chemins coutumiers) are an expression of the 
relational frame of Kanak society. This notion comes from the rough physical tracks that men 
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followed to go to the territory of another clan. These itineraries became part of the landscape 
and they were the natural network of the exchange of foods, to get access for fishing or hunting, 
and to ask for a woman in marriage. Although these chemins coutumiers are virtual because 
Kanaks can now use other and faster roads, they still structure relationships between 
individuals, families and clans. These paths have been inaugurated in the past and sometimes 
mythical times and, if respected, they are seen to guarantee a society’s future. Following this 
spatial and temporal logic, Macron should have to pursue a specific path, giving back the 
original deed: he would need to make a traditional act of contrition in Balade, where the original 
deed was signed, and then he should have deposited it in the Tjibaou Cultural Centre, delivering 
it to the customary authorities of the specific customary area “Djubéa-Kaponé”. Macron was 
supposed to ‘renew’ history, there is a customary path that has to be respected, giving the deed 
back to customary authorities means that it is recognised that it is the Kanak people who have 
been colonised (personal interview). In the eyes of the Kanak, Macron reduced this act to a 
simple geographical transfer without any deep appreciation for its historical significance.  
 
What it is at stake in the Self-determination Referendum  
The increasing power of separatist parties has repeatedly challenged the French 
government. The last provincial elections, held on 22 May 2019, have confirmed this power 
and nourished the ethnical and geographical gap between the Kanak and non-Kanak, as well 
as between the (more Indigenous) north and the (more European) south of Grande Terre. 
Recent elections have also introduced a new political force: the moderate loyalist party 
Calédonie Ensemble has been replaced by a more radical Avenir en Confiance.  
However, the major victory for separatist groups remains the result of the 4 November 
2018 referendum. Against all statistical projections and polls, 43.33% of electors voted for 
independence, with an unusually low turn-out at just 81.01% (Haut Commissariat, 2018), the 
most remarkable one in the history of independence referendum in New Caledonia. According 
to data collected by Denise Fisher (2019b), in local provincial elections from 1999, turn-out 
has varied from 69.95% to 76.42%, in French parliamentary elections it has been around 40%, 
and in European elections only 27.5% in 2014. The result of this last referendum is fundamental 
for maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the United Nations: if it had been low, there would 
have been the risk of deletion from its list of territories to be decolonised.  
I was in the field when, on 1May 2018, FLNKS launched its campaign for independence. 
Although separatist leaders had already started their propaganda with the presentation of the 
“Projet de Société”, that day they officially announced the forthcoming informational tour 
among the tribes, finalised to convince and help registering Kanak people in the “special 
electoral list for the referendum” (LESC). The main issue was to physically search for those 
who had no identification card. Living with the secretary of the separatist mayor of Koné, I 
have had also the opportunity to follow closely the informational tour organised by FLNKS in 
the houses of Caldoches, descendants of the first colons and convicts and traditionally pro-
France. A few months after the launch of the FLNKS campaign, the Labour Party and the 
syndicalist party USTKE - who had broken with the FLNKS -  voted to boycott the referendum 
because they claimed it was illegitimate: for them, in a true self-determination referendum, 
only the colonised people should have the right to choose whether to remain French or become 
independent. In the last Signatory Committee of the Nouméa Agreement met in Paris on 2 
November 2017, pro-independence parties obtained to have Kanak registered automatically, in 
return of the opening of LESC to all people born in New Caledonia with only three years of 
permanent residence (Gouvernement France, 2017).  
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FLNKS is the only separatist entity which, from the start of the decolonisation process, 
officially presented a project for an independent society, a set of fundamental principles for a 
new independent state. According to this document, the political institutions of the territory 
would be organised as follow: electors would vote for municipalities and provinces; the 
national assembly would be composed of members of provinces; the President of the Republic 
would be elected by a Committee composed of members of the national assembly, the Chamber 
of Representatives and municipalities. Only the President would be able to dissolve the national 
assembly and propose a government, which in turn can be approved or not by the national 
assembly. One of the main changes is the insertion of the Chamber of Representatives that 
would replace the current Customary Senate. This would be made up of representatives of all 
communities present in New Caledonia. The Customary Senate does not agree with the FLNKS 
project, not simply because of the potential reduction of their institutional authority; but also 
because they do not share the same nickel-management policy. Although the Labour Party has 
boycotted the referendum, and the separatist movement is much more fragmented, the 
referendum has demonstrated that separatists are unified in the same objective: independence 
from France. 
During the next three years of stalemate, the challenge for France will be to remain 
neutral. Away from being just a bad memory, Les Evènements (the Events) are still an open 
chapter of New Caledonia’s history. In order to assure regional and internal stability, this 
process will be supervised by neighbouring states, the Pacific Islands Forum and the United 
Nations, which have monitored the decolonisation process. The future of New Caledonia and 
Bougainville takes on grater regional importance, as the Pacific Islands Forum and Melanesian 
Spearhead Group debate the issue of West Papua (Maclellan, 2018; Fisher, 2019a). Moreover, 
given the growing network of shared solidarity between secessionist and pro-independence 
movements in the Pacific (Asia Pacific Report, 2018a, 2018b; Francinfo 2018a, 2018b), we 
can assume that instabilities in New Caledonia could influence the forthcoming self-
determination referendum in Bougainville, as well as the separatist parties in Western Papua 
and in French Polynesia, creating a domino effect and provoking instabilities in other islands 
of the Pacific. In a personal interview with the journalist Nic Maclellan (2019), Oscar Temaru, 
leader of the Maohi independence movement, said that they are sure that the accession of New 
Caledonia to independence and sovereignty will also mean self-determination for their country 
Maohi Nui.  
However, France is obviously committed to being present in the Pacific. The French 
overseas presence in the Pacific Ocean is a huge weight for conserving France’ status as a 
world power. Its huge Exclusive Economic Zones make it the second world maritime nation 
after United States, as Macron has repeatedly highlighted in his stay in New Caledonia. 
Following Fisher (2019a), France is still interested in exploring the large hydrocarbon and 
natural gas reserves off-shore that seem to have been discovered by French and Australian 
scientists between the economic exclusive zones of New Caledonia and Australia (Nouze et 
al., 2009; Valley et al., 2003). IFREMER published a study on new mineral exploration 
opportunities offshore. The introduction to the document holds the motivation for the project, 
 
Taking into account the risks of Europe's shortage of strategic metals supplies for many 
industries … With a vast oceanic territory, technological means and skills long recognised 
in the study of large sea beds, France must remain a major player in this exploration, at a 
time when the conditions for industrial development are being designed (IFREMER, 2011, 
p. 3).  
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Nodules rich in cobalt and platinum have been found off the western cost of French Polynesia 
and iron, manganese, cobalt and some gold and silver off New Caledonia (Fisher, 2019a; Sénat 
2012; Sénat 2013). After Brexit, France will be the only European Union state in the Pacific 
Ocean (considering that the United Kingdom’s presence is restricted to the Pitcairn Islands); 
but “one of many more players in the region” (Fisher, 2015, p. 3), 
As a sovereign resident power, France has a privileged position at regional tables such as 
Quadrilateral Defence Meetings with the United States, Australia and New Zealand, with 
the Pacific arguably overtaking the Atlantic in geostrategic importance, and other players 
seeking to engage in the region. New Caledonia has replaced French Polynesia as France’s 
Pacific strategic priority (Fisher, 2019, p.16). 
 
Meanwhile, Australia’s perception of an Indo-Pacific axis – a geopolitical partnership 
between the Indo-Pacific Ocean states – differs from the French one. For Emmanuel Macron, 
it is a strategy to contrast China’s expansion and secure France’s presence in the Pacific. 
Australia, however, is more keen on assuring the geographical area’s stability by maintaining 
good international relations with other “occupying states” of the area (Fisher, 2019). 
 
Islandness and Resource Management  
According to Allen (2017), ‘islandness’ can be an important variable in analyzing social 
and political economic processes (Baldacchino, 2004, 2005; Mountz, 2013). In New Caledonia, 
the sense of territorial identity finds its highest expression in the Kanak notion of “land”. The 
words of Paul Néaoutyine, Northern Province President, are emblematic in this regard, 
We are Oceanians. Land, which is scarce on our islands, has since time immemorial 
been the foundation of our social organisation and our life. We have a very close 
relationship with the land and the sea … From our perspective, land is either out the 
water or under the water. Dry land is on an island and submerged land is the river or sea 
bed (Néaoutyine, 1994, p.109). 
Land is at the core of both colonisation processes and separatist claims. By pushing on 
the particular link with the land as socio-political marker of, and by affirming the right to self-
determination in the name of ‘Indigeneity’, in the 1970s and 1980s first separatist parties made 
the land issue the symbol of their struggle for independence.  
Since the onset of colonisation, the Kanak population was gradually confined in more 
and more limited spaces, deprived of land and of the possibility of moving freely. It was after 
1864 – when a penitentiary centre was created and cattle raising became extensive – that the 
tendency to expropriate and sell large plots of land really took off. This process had at least 
three consequences: it encouraged speculative accumulation of land, it over-exploited pastures; 
and it escalated ethnical conflict. Following the examples of the Indios and Aboriginal 
Australians, the French government delimited lands recognised as necessary for Indigenous 
needs through the reserve system. If for European colons land represented capital, a marker of 
prestige and their visible presence in the territory, for Kanaks it was and is (ontologically) 
important because it hosted ancestral beings. This place-making of Melanesian space, 
ultimately leads to the notion of ‘tribe’ and ‘collective propriety’ (Merle, 1995). That 
phenomenon, along with massive waves of immigration and the politics of economic 
marginalisation, reduced Kanak vital space. Allen (2017, p. 85) suggests that “island-wide 
identities and sociopolitical movements are, in the first instance, the product of experience and 
struggle associated with the introduction of capitalist social relations under colonialism”. In 
this regard, what follows is part of a long interview granted to me by Paul Néaoutyine,  
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Islandness is not a problem. We did not know to be an island and that there were bigger 
countries. We are the native people, we were born here and we have all references here. 
The starting point is that: we come from here and we are not foreigners (on est d’ici et pas 
d’ailleurs). The fact to be a small island between others in a big archipelago is not a 
problem. Our identity problem is that we were in our home and another people came to 
expropriate our lands. They put us in reserves and imposed things for us to do. Therefore, 
firstly, we took consciousness to be in our home, to exist as a people, then we become 
aware of nickel. … We knew about agriculture, environment, that we could built houses, 
use water, plant yam; but, in our experience, in our custom and in the words we use, there 
is no word for nickel, for what lies under the ground or for what is on the seabed. But we 
knew that there are fish in the rivers, trees grow and that we could cultivate crops. It is our 
environment and we lived off this. The insularity issue in relation to the management of 
natural resources is something that was imposed on us when they reduced our vital space. 
First thing to do is find it again. It is our identity claim. (Personal interview, Koné, 2018). 
In Néaoutyine’s opinion, a reduction of vital space brings out the physical limits of 
islandness. This geographical condition is not perceived as restrictive: indeed, in a mythical 
past, Indigenous peoples did not necessarily know to be living on an island, nor that there were 
bigger and populous countries beyond their shores. Islandness was rendered visible when they 
lost their daily geographical references (“We knew about agriculture …) and identity as well. 
From this time on, the first thing to do for Kanaks became to rediscover their vital space. The 
“spatial logic of identity” (Bensa, 1992) is a reaction to the French settlement policy that 
permanently accompanies the Kanak independence movement. This logic played an important 
role in nationalist movements, not only in New Caledonia but also in nearby Vanuatu 
(Wittersheim, 2003), Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. In the words of Eloi Poigoune, 
ex-leader of one of the first Kanak groups which claimed a total return of expropriated lands,  
There is a deep link that we have shared generation after generation, between us and 
the land. I think that it is this notion which pushed me during the struggle for 
independence. We wanted our deep identity, which was ignored over the years, to be 
acknowledged (personal interview, Nouméa, 2018). 
 
Land claims were based on the principle that land was a fundamental part of social 
identity, independently of its economic value. Land expropriation has never cancelled the 
memory of the places occupied before colonisation, and whose names are still assigned to 
families and clans.  
That nickel is an economic resource is quite obvious; but, in focusing only on its 
materiality, we risk de-historicising and de-politicising it. Nickel was the instrument used by 
the colonial system to marginalise the Kanak people. In the 1980s, Jean-Marie Tjibaou began 
to talk about nickel as an ancestral heritage to be used and exploited in a sustainable way 
(Tjibaou, 1996). Tjibaou contributed to the geostrategic reorientation of New Caledonia’s 
relationship toward its neighbouring states. He argued, 
 
sovereignty means the right to choose one’s partner. For a small country like ours, 
independence means working out interdependency (Tjibaou, 2005, p. 179).  
  
Although Tjibaou was influenced by the values of the Pacific Way (Crocombe, 1976), 
Kanak society has been faced with a double challenge: how to emancipate itself from colonial 
dependence and at the same time become part of a global world. Actually, in New Caledonia, 
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the Pacific Way has never had the same resonance as in other Pacific islands. If Tjibaou’s 
cultural policies were close to the wave of Indigenous solidarity of the 1970s, his road map 
remains unique and original. Interdependency was for him an imperative due to the “life in 
network” of small island societies, a pre-condition of their autonomy and political 
independence. As Clifford (2013) affirmed, Tjibaou can be viewed as closer to Epeli Hau'ofa 
because both projected an indigenous-cosmopolitan vision, rejecting instead exclusively ethnic 
or national policies (Hau'ofa, 1993). If islandness can be a container of violent conflicts (Allen, 
2017), at the same time it seems that this geographical condition can became a fundamental 
variable that nourishes policies of expansion and openness (Favole & Giordana, 2017).  
 
Making space for yourself  
 
“Nickel contains the land and the blood of all the elders who lived there”; “it contains 
the fight for the independence”; “it is a part of us that travels to share”; “it’s our contribution 
to the construction of the modern world” (personal interviews). These examples of local 
narratives  are very similar to those reported by Katerina Teaiwa on the subject of phosphate, 
the mineral that for more than a century has consumed Banaba island.  
 
[I]f Banabans think of blood and land as one and the same, it follows then than losing 
their land, they lost their blood. In losing their phosphate to agriculture, they have 
spilled their blood in different lands. Their essential roots on Ocean Island are now 
essentially routes to other places. Places like New Zealand, Australia and Fiji (Teaiwa, 
2015, p. 158). 
 
Kanaks want to exit from the colonial economic system by defusing its mechanisms from 
the inside. It is not a matter of Indigenisation or a re-appropriation of an exogenous world; but 
of being present and acknowledged within the global system, with the same opportunities as 
other (sovereign) states. It is an issue of “making space for yourself”. From the very first years 
of colonisation, the Kanaks saw their possibility of movement seriously reduced: first, with the 
establishment of reserves from 1880; and then the Code de l’Indigenat. However, if between 
the 1970s and 1980s the separatist movement claimed to be recognised as acting on behalf of 
the Kanak people, fighting for the restitution of expropriated lands, since the end of the 1980s 
the main axis of the struggle for independence became the economy. The new slogans of 
FLNKS were: to be self-sufficient; to produce for commerce; to build; and to take control of 
those economic sectors historically managed by France. This was called the “economy of 
struggle”: an extension of political power into the economic sector. In the words of Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou, 
 
We – Melanesians on the fringes of the economy – are taking the risk of trying to be 
involved, of using the economic machinery as a weapon in the fight to win leadership 
positions and to gain independence. It is an extraordinary gamble because our people 
have always seen the economy as one of the means of alienation used by the 
administration, the judicial system, in the arsenal of state apparatus that marginalises 
and alienates us (Tjibaou, 2005, p. 263). 
The ‘socialism’ that constitutes FLNKS’ economic policy must not mislead. Initially, the 
notion of Kanak socialism referred to micro development projects, in the form of small 
cooperative enterprises that came into being in the tribes (Demmer, 2016). This allowed to 
integrate tribes into market logic preserving at the same time a form of social and political 
organisation based on the relations between the clans, gathered around a chief (chefferie). In 
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the last version of FLNKS’ booklet outlining new institutions for an independent state (“Projet 
de Société”) the notion of “socialism” is not well explained; it is only said that it is a “socialism 
in action” anchored in the real world; while, in public policy meetings, it is often presented as 
a form of ‘solidarity’.  
Historically within the FLNKS, the two major parties Union Calédonienne and Palika 
does not share the same vision of socialism: one prefers to put forward cultural values (e.g. 
attachment to the clan and affiliations) and the other - inspired by historical materialism - to 
social values, fighting against individual interests, social class divisions and politico-economic 
inequalities.  
In general, we can say that “socialism” does not refer to socialist practice as experienced 
in Western Europe. Rather than an ideology, it is a revolutionary spirit which blends populism 
and nationalism but also ancient Kanak references with religious ones. It is constituted by the 
will of breaking with the dominant-dominated relationship, and encouraging power sharing 
instead.   
 
Regional Geopolitics of Nickel  
 
“In this region of the world, China is building its hegemony, step by step. It is not about 
fear-mongering, but about looking at reality,” President Macron said, addressing Caledonians 
in 2018. His argument is based on the size of New Caledonia: should it be left unto itself, 
without the ‘protection’ of France, the island is too small to prevent being taken over by China. 
Nevertheless, the French President supports the “Indo-Pacific axis” in order to contrast the 
geopolitical ambitions of China in the Pacific Ocean; and the local mining society Société 
minière du Sud Pacifique (SMSP), together with the FLNKS, look strategically at being the 
top producer and exporter of nickel in the world as a partner that may increase its global 
competitiveness. In the new SMSP trading asset, the territory is compared to a ship that carries 
nickel ore, as defined by Pascal Goffinet, member of Union Calédonienne party, sailing with 
its bow towards South-East Asia.  
According to the USGS (United States Geological Survey), global nickel reserves are 
estimated at some 95 billion tons in 2018. New Caledonia lies in fifth position (with 7%), 
preceded by Russia (8%), Brazil (12%), Australia (20%) and Indonesia (22%) (IEOM, 2018). 
The 1998 Nouméa agreement is important, not only for having recognized the “colonial fact” 
and the existence of a “Kanak people” for the first time (a unique event among French overseas 
territories); but also because it completely modified mining policy, transferring ownership of 
the subsoil from the French State to New Caledonia (art. 57 of “loi organique”). Today, the 
Congress is charged with legislation on mining issues concerning nickel, chrome, cobalt and 
hydrocarbons. In  contrast, each province has the competence to decide who has the right to 
explore and exploit minerals. Therefore, in the last 30 years, the mining industry in New 
Caledonia has shifted from being mono-productive to multi-productive: to the historical 
industry of Doniambo, owned by SLN, whose major shareholder is the French state, has been 
added the current Brazilian hydro-metallurgic industry owned by “Vale Nouvelle-Calédonie” 
(VNC) and the pyro-metallurgic one owned by “Koniambo Nickel Sas” (KNS), a joint-venture 
51% owned by SMSP and 49% by Glencore-Xstrata (KNS, 2019; VALE, 2019). The structure 
of capital 51%-49% is not an indication that the subaltern class have obtained control over the 
means of production, as is often said by the Kanak population. As Paul Néaoutyine told me,  
 
what is Marxist is not the structure of capital but the analysis of political forces. The power 
of the colonial system can exploit our natural resources to increase the profit of France 
without any return in New Caledonia” (personal interview, Koné, 2018).  
M. Gentilucci 
 166 
As in Papua New Guinea (PNG), mineral exports account for much of the value of New 
Caledonia’s export total; but, unlike PNG, relatively few people live in poverty in New 
Caledonia, which has the second highest GDP of all France’s overseas regions. There are two 
mining regulations relating to mineral exports in New Caledonia the “Schéma de mise en valeur 
des richesses minières de la Nouvelle-Calédonie” and the “Doctrine Nickel”, a mining and 
industrial strategy adopted by FLNKS in 2015. The second was created in order to encompass 
a big void left by the first: mining companies are completely free to follow their own trading 
policy. This means that SLN is free to sell huge amounts of nickel ore without assuring added 
value to the New Caledonia economy. In giving a new lease of life to some mines that would 
otherwise have been shut down, and selling the ore only to those off-shore industries owned at 
51% (by China and South Korea), the strategy of FLNKS and SMSP is designed to derive 
maximum value from the mineral resource, ensuring the life of nickel. The agreement with the 
Korean POSCO and Chinese Yangzhou Yichuan provides for an annual supply of, 
respectively: 1,800,000 tons of low-grade ore (1.8%-2.1%) for a total amount of 30 years; and 
600,000 tons of more low-grade ore (under 2.1%) for 25 years. Against the land-grabbing 
phenomenon, where natural capital has usually expropriated and exploited local populations in 
return for royalties or compensations, SMSP has protected its natural capital which remains in 
Northern Province. Recently, the New Caledonia government has authorised SLN to export 4 
million tons of nickel annually to China and Japan for a period of ten years, without the 
agreement of separatist leaders. Paul Néaoutyine has condemned the industrial policy of SLN 
as “scorched earth” (Le Figaro, 2019). 
 
Conclusion  
Mining is imbued within the spirit of cultural production (Boltanski and Chiapello, 
2017). The spirit of capitalism is the ideology that justifies people’s commitment to capitalism 
and which renders this commitment attractive. In order to motivate the engagement of subjects, 
capitalism needs to naturalise itself, grounding its legitimation outside, beyond itself, in the 
cultural productions of its time. Therefore, the resilience of capitalism rests on its capacity to 
legitimate itself in something that already exists and is widely accepted. Following this logic, 
the spirit of mining needs to enter into dialogue with Kanak culture in order to secure the moral 
foundations that it lacks. The deep unity with the land has always been the distinguishing mark 
of the Kanak independence movement; the engagement with this mining project has challenged 
this spiritual human-environment relationship. How far can the human intervention push? What 
are the customary authorities’ responsibilities? Being-in-the-world through engagement with 
the mining sector entails an ontological crisis and a negotiation with the ancestral beings who 
live in the mined lands. It is not only an issue of how to spread mining benefits among the 
landowners because, since the beginning of the project, the FLNKS imposed its collectivistic 
policy. Actually, the major concerns were around the reactions of ancestral beings and the 
potential dangers for whoever worked on the massif. Land is classically constituted of four 
spaces: geological, geographical, cultural and juridical. For this reason, “it is important where 
you put your feet”, according to a local expression. There are also some privileged places 
considered sacred and taboo because they are a theatre of mythic generative experiences 
between humans and deities. These places, which can be water sources or stones, are the 
symbolic centre of a clan territory. In the Koniambo massif, these have been catalogued and 
industrial access there has been banned. 
It is too early to say if Kanak engagement in mining and metallurgy will become a neo-
colonial trick in the long period, due to its dependence on global capitalism and world market 
fluctuations in demand, supply and price. Sometimes, FLNKS policy is perceived by other 
separatist parties as too much oriented to consider France as a partner rather than a rapacious 
and colonial state. While the FLNKS promotes a discourse of national liberation of New 
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Caledonia from France’s yoke and thinks about nickel as a communal good belonging to all 
the country (nationalistic vision), the Labour Party (along with the Customary Senate) instead 
lead a discourse of “Indigeneity”, looking at nickel as a good belonging to the Indigenous 
people (ethnic vision). Among Kanaks themselves, the opinion about mining is not unanimous: 
if for someone it can be the starting-point for local and sustainable economic development, for 
others, there is a high risk to become dependent on the global market and its corporations. This 
fragmentation within the separatist movement makes Philippe Gomes, leader of the loyalist 
party Calédonie Ensemble, argues,  
 
[i]t is necessary for separatists to abandon their claims for independence as they have 
advanced them in the 1970s, following the great wave of decolonisation (2018, p. 21).  
 
However, far from abandonment, young Kanak people have adopted the counter-
globalisation discourse. My ethnography suggests that they are becoming more radicalised, 
returning to a climate of violence, fighting outside the institutions.  
However, what we can say is that this Kanak engagement has challenged the structure of 
dependence from France and the SLN’s monopoly over local nickel: both mechanisms have 
produced exclusion and inequality for more than a century. Recent SMSP partnerships with 
China and South Korea suggest that separatists are following a regional dynamic that makes 
New Caledonia an “island in connection” or  an ‘island connectivity in motion’ (e.g. Schnepel 
& Alpers, 2017). As Samuel Goromido, former president of the Customary Senate said to me, 
in order to decolonise our gaze we need to reconsider the power of separatist parties, 
 
When they look at us from there, from the métropole, Europeans often they think that 
France is the power. But it is us who have pushed France to evolve in this decolonisation 
process. If you start to think following this logic, you decolonise your thinking (personal 
interview, Koné, 2018). 
 
As separatist leaders love to repeat when they are invited to TV talk shows: if New 
Caledonia today has secured a certain degree of autonomy – from which the loyalists are 
benefiting handsomely – then, this is all thanks to them.  
The French government knows that mining will continue to be the big issue for the future, 
especially at this particular political conjuncture. In 1998, access to the natural resource was 
the preliminary condition of separatists to resume any negotiation with France. If at the end of 
the third and last referendum by 2022, New Caledonia choses to stay with France, then mining 
will again be at the centre of any negotiations. 
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